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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH I 
Plaintiff/Respondent, : Case No. 880281-CA 
v. i 
ROBERT PAUL PACHECO# t Priority 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a conviction of burglary in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-202 (1978) and theft, a class 
B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1978), 
following a jury trial in Third District Court, in and for Salt 
Lake County, the Honorable David S. Young, Judge, presiding. 
This Court has jurisdiction of this appeal under Utah Code Ann. 
S 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1987) and Utah Code Ann. S 77-35-26(2)(a) (Supp. 
1988). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the pretrial identification procedures were 
so unduly suggestive that defendant's due process rights were 
violated and whether he was so prejudiced he is entitled to a new 
trial• 
2. Whether the admission into evidence of a photo 
array prejudiced defendant by informing the jury that he has 
prior criminal convictions. Whether defendant properly preserved 
for appeal the issue of whether the trial court committed error 
in determining that defendant could be impeached by introduction 
of a prior conviction. 
3. Whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain 
defendant's convictions for burglary and theft. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Fifth Amendment, United States Constitution: 
No person shall be held to answer for a 
capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless 
on a presentment or indictment of a Grand 
Jury, except in cases arising in the land or 
naval forces, or in the Militia, when in 
actual service in time of War or public 
danger; nor shall any person be subject for 
the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy 
of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in 
any criminal case to be a witnes.s against 
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law; nor 
shall private property be taken for public 
use, without just compensation. 
Fourteenth Amendment, United States Constitution (in part): 
. . . nor shall any State deprive any person 
of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law; nor deny to any person within 
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
laws. 
Article I, Section 7, Constitution of Utah: 
Sec. 7. [Due Process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, 
liberty or property, without due process of 
law. 
Utah Code Ann. $ 76-6-202 (1978): 
Burglary - (1) A person is guilty of 
burglary if he enters or remains unlawfully 
in a building or any portion of a building 
with intent to commit a felony or theft or 
commit an assault on any person. 
(2) Burglary is a felony of the third 
degree unless it was committed in a dwelling, 
in which event it is a felony of the second 
degree. 
Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-404 (1978): 
Theft - Elements - A person commits theft if 
he obtains or exercises unauthorized control 
over the property of another with a purpose 
to deprive him thereof. 
Utah Code Ann. S 77-35-19(c) (1982): 
(c) No party may assign as error any 
portion of the charge or omission therefrom 
unless he objects thereto before the jury is 
instructed, stating distinctly the matter to 
which he objects and the ground of his 
objection. Notwithstanding a party's failure 
to object, error may be assigned to 
instructions in order to avoid manifest 
injustice. 
Utah Code Ann. S 77-35-30(a) (1982): 
Any error, defect, irregularity or variance 
which does not affect the substantial rights 
of a party shall be disregarded. 
Utah R. of Evid. 403. Exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds 
of prejudice, confusion, or waste of time. 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded 
it is probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, 
confusion of the issues, or misleading the 
jury, or by considerations of undue delay, 
waste of time, or needless presentation of 
cumulative evidence. 
Utah R. of Evid. 609. Impeachment be evidence of conviction of crime. 
General rule. For the purpose of 
attacking the credibility of a witness, 
evidence that he has been convicted of a 
crime shall be admitted if elicited from him 
or established by public record during cross-
examination but only if the crime (1) was 
punishable by death or imprisonment in excess 
of one year under the law under which he was 
convicted, and the court determines that the 
probative value of admitting this evidence 
outweighs its prejudicial effect to the 
defendant, or (2) involved dishonesty or 
false statement, regardless of the 
punishment. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Robert Paul Pacheco, was charged with 
burglary, a second degree felony in violation of Utah Code Ann, 
S 76-6-202 (1978) and theft, a class B misdemeanor, in violation 
of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1978). He was convicted as charged 
following a jury trial on March 24 and 25, 1988. He was 
sentenced to not less than one nor more than fifteen years in the 
Utah State Prison on the burglary conviction and to six months on 
the theft conviction; the sentences were ordered to run 
concurrently. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On April 7, 1987, Katherine and Ray Welch were 
burglarized (T. 28). While they were working in their backyard, 
a man, later identified as the defendant, knocked on their front 
door (T. 17-18). The man went into the house and stole money 
from both Mr. and Mrs. Welches' wallets (T. 38). Mr. Welch 
discovered the man when he went to the house for a jacket (T. 
36). The man fled from the house, ran across the lawn, jumped a 
fence, ran to his car parked nearby and sped away (T. 37). 
On the day in question, Josephine Eward, who lives 
directly across the street from Mr. and Mrs. Welch, saw a white 
and blue Nova drive up and park near the Welches' home (T. 12-
13). She saw a man get out of the car and approach the door (T. 
14). She was aware that the Welches were in their backyard as 
the man knocked two or three times on the front door (T. 18). 
She only saw his back, but noted the shirt he was wearing and 
noticed that he was thin (T. 17). Defendant is 5'6M and weighs 
130 pounds (T. 84). Mrs. Eward did not see defendant enter the 
house, but later saw the man suddenly run down the porch stairs 
and across the lawn, jump the fence, get into his car and quickly 
drive away (T. 18-19). 
After working in the backyard, Mr. Welch went to the 
house for a jacket and saw someone in his kitchen (T. 36). The 
man ran through the dining room, into the hall and out the door 
to his blue and white car parked nearby (T. 37). Mr. Welch 
yelled at him, but the man continued on (T. 37). When he got to 
his car, he turned to look back (T. 37). Mr. Welch observed the 
man to be wearing a plaid shirt, but because he had not seen his 
face, was unable to identify him (T. 36-38) 
Katherine Welch was working in the backyard mowing the 
lawn with her husband (T. 25). She heard her husband yell and 
ran to the fence as she saw a man go out of the house and run. 
She observed that he was slender, moved rapidly, and was wearing 
a red and white checkered shirt and beige or tan pants (T. 26). 
He ran to a blue and white car and drove away (T. 27). 
Connie Luna, who lives "kitty-corner" to the Welches, 
got a good look at the man and was able to positively identify 
him (T. 61). Mrs. Luna was standing on her porch waiting for her 
husband to get home from work when she saw defendant at the 
Welches' house; at that time she only saw his back (T. 46). 
Later, she heard Ray Welch yell (T. 47). Because Mrs. Luna 
realized something was amiss, she ran across the yard to get a 
better look at defendant and yelled "hey you" (T. 47). Defendant 
ran to his car and drove off (T. 47). Mrs. Luna was within about 
twenty feet of defendant and was able to look at him "full face" 
(T. 51-52)• He was wearing a red checkered shirt which she 
described as tweed and beige pants (T. 51). Mrs. Luna was able 
to identify clothes introduced at trial as appearing to be the 
clothes defendant was wearing on the day he committed the crimes 
(T. 55/ 67); the clothes had been seized defendant's home 
pursuant to a warrant (T. 80-81). 
Mrs. Luna's eye-witness identification is corroborated 
by the fact that she was able to describe the car defendant was 
driving; the car was a blue and white car and she identified it 
in a photograph admitted at trial (T. 47-48). Not only was she 
able to identify the car based upon its appearance, she obtained 
the license number of the car before defendant sped away (T. 49). 
She could still remember the license number on the day of trial 
(T. 49). The car was, in fact, registered to defendant (T. 77). 
Mrs. Luna was asked to look at a photo spread about a 
week after the incident; she was not able to positively identify 
the perpetrator, but identified defendant's photo as the person 
who "looked like" the man who committed the crime (T. 56-57). 
The photo spread contained black and white drivers license photos 
and the photo of defendant was not recent (T. 57, 64). About two 
weeks later, she was asked to examine a second photo-spread (T. 
58). The second photo spread contained colored photos (T. 79). 
Because the second photo spread contained higher quality photos, 
she was able to conclusively identify defendant from the photo 
spread (T. 59, 71). The detective did not suggest to Mrs. Luna 
that she identify anyone in either photo spread (T. 71). 
Mrs. Luna's identification of defendant was 
unequivocal. She was positive that the man she had seen on the 
day in question was defendant and identified him in court (T. 56, 
61). 
Defendant denied having committed the burglary and 
theft. He claimed to have lent his car to his son Troy (T. 116). 
He was unable to articulate why he remembered April 7 as the day 
when he had lent the car to his son (T. 119-121, 128). He had 
lent the car to his son a second time but was unable to identify 
with any specificity the second date on which he lent the car (T. 
128). 
Defendant's girlfriend stated that defendant had not 
seen his son Troy since 1986 because he and his son had had a 
fight (T. 104). Defendant, however, stated that on April 7 he 
loaned the car to Troy after Troy had contacted him and they 
"apologized" about their "fued" (T. 116). Because of this 
incident, defendant has not seen Troy since April 7 (T. 128). 
Troy's stated purpose in borrowing the car was to go to 
Heber to get his children (T. 116). Defendant stated that Troy 
returned the car at about 5 p.m. (T. 121). Initially he stated 
that he had "no idea" whether Troy had the children with him when 
he returned (T. 126). He then testified that he had asked Troy 
about the children and Troy told him he had taken the children 
back to Heber City (T. 127). 
Defendant was 42 years old at the time of trial; Troy 
was 22 (T. 113, 124). Troy is defendant's biological son (T. 
124) and their is apparently some family resemblance (T. Ill); 
however, Mrs. Luna identified defendant, not Troy, as being the 
perpetrator (T. 56, 61). 
Defendant was unemployed at the time of the burglary 
and theft (T. 123). At trial he presented medical records 
concerning an injury to his leg which he claimed caused him to be 
unable to run (T. 117-19). Defendant's medical records reflected 
that he had received treatment in 1984 and in November of 1987; 
defendant had not received medical treatment during the relevant 
time of April 1987 (126). 
Defendant admitted he had made no effort to locate Troy 
prior to trial (T. 132). He also did not ask Troy's children or 
his mother, people Troy was allegedly with on April 7, about 
Troy's whereabouts on that day (T. 131). 
Following presentation of the evidence, the jury 
deliberated and found defendant guilty as charged (T. 157). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The identification methods utilized by police 
authorities were not unduly suggestive, and did not deny 
defendant's constitutional right to due process. The police 
utilized two photo spreads. The first consisted of black and 
white photographs; the second consisted of color photographs 
which were more recent. An eye-witness, Connie Luna, identified 
defendant in the first photo spread as looking like the 
perpetrator. However, because of the quality of the photographs, 
she was unable to be positive. Consequently, the detective 
compiled a second photo spread with better quality photographs. 
Mrs. Luna positively chose defendant from the second group of 
pictures. The techniques used by the detective were not unduly 
suggestive. Nevertheless, the eyewitness identification, under 
the totality of the circumstances was reliable. The admission of 
the evidence did not deny defendant due process of law. 
The second photo spread was admitted at trial and bore 
photographs which contained the words "Salt Lake County Sheriff's 
Office." Whether these photographs were taken at the time of 
jail booking as the result of having committed a crime is outside 
the knowledge of an average juror. Regardless, the photographs 
did not link defendant with prior criminal activity. The photo 
spread had probative value and its admission did not inform the 
jury that defendant had a prior criminal record. 
Defendant has waived the issue of whether he could be 
impeached by the use of prior convictions. The record does not 
contain a ruling on this issue. Additionally, defendant, not the 
prosecution, introduced this evidence during direct examination. 
Connie Luna positively identified defendant as the 
person who had committed the burglary. The eye-witness 
identification and other corroborative evidence was sufficient to 
establish defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURES UTILIZED BY THE 
POLICE IN THIS CASE DID NOT DENY DEFENDANT'S 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS. 
Defendant contends that the identification procedures 
utilized by Detective LaMont in this case were unduly suggestive 
and violated due process rights guaranteed him by the fifth and 
fourteenth amendments of the United States Constitution and by 
article I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution. He contends that 
the photo spreads utilized in this case were so suggestive that 
Connie Luna's identification of him at trial was unreliable and 
constitutes reversible error. 
In the leading case of Simmons v. United States, 390 
U.S. 377 (1968), the Supreme Court addressed the defendant's 
claim that the use of an unduly suggestive photo array prior to 
trial violated his right of due process. In an opinion by 
Justice Harlan, the Court acknowledged the possibility that 
showing photographs to witnesses might cause them to err in 
identifying criminal suspects. Ld. at 384. Nevertheless, the 
Court recognized the validity of pretrial photographic 
identification, stating that "this procedure has been used widely 
and effectively in criminal law enforcement, from the standpoint 
both of apprehending offenders and of sparing innocent suspects 
the ignominy of arrest by allowing eyewitnesses to exonerate them 
through scrutiny of photographs." Ld. The Court then set forth 
the constitutional standard by which photo identification 
procedures should be judged: 
We are unwilling to prohibit [the employment 
of photographic identification], either in 
the exercise of our supervisory power or, 
still less, as a matter of constitutional 
requirement. Instead, we hold that each case 
must be considered on its own facts, and that 
convictions based on eyewitness identi-
fication at trial following a pretrial 
identification by photograph will be set 
aside on the ground only if the photographic 
identification procedure was so 
impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a 
very substantial likelihood of irreparable 
misidentification. This standard accords 
with our resolution of a similar issue in 
Stovall v, Denno, and with decisions of other 
courts on the question of identification by 
photograph. 
Id, (Emphasis added) (citations omitted)• 
The competing interests of efficient criminal 
investigation and fairness of process to the accused were 
similarly dealt with by the Supreme Court of Utah in State v. 
Perry, 27 Utah 2d 48, 492 P.2d 1349 (1972). While recognizing 
that "caution must be observed to see injustice does not result 
from the uses of methods which unfairly focus attention upon a 
particular suspect," the Court went on to state that "peace 
officers should not be unduly hampered in legitimate attempts to 
investigate crimes and to seek out and identify those who have 
committed them." Ld. at 1352. If a claim of injustice in the 
identification procedures does arise, the Court posited that the: 
circumstances of the individual case should 
be scrutinized carefully by the trial court 
to see whether in the identification 
procedures there was anything done which 
should be regarded as so suggestive or 
persuasive that there is a reasonable 
likelihood that the identification was not a 
genuine product of the knowledge and 
recollection of the witness, but was 
something to distorted or tainted that in 
fairness and justness the guilt of innocence 
of an accused should not be allowed to be 
tested thereby. 
Id. (Citations omitted.) 
A due process claim will arise, according to the 
standard elucidated by the United States Supreme Court in Simmons 
and followed by the Utah Supreme Court in Perry, only if the 
identification procedure was so impermissibly suggestive as to 
give rise to a very substantial likelihood of irreparable 
misidentification. 
In Neil v. Bigqers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972), the United 
States Supreme Court indicated that suggestiveness, alone, is not 
sufficient to suppress pre-trial identification. The Court set 
fourth five factors to be considered in determining whether under 
the "totality of the circumstances" the identification of a 
defendant was reliable even though the confrontation procedure 
was suggestive. First, the trial court must consider the 
opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time of 
the crime. Second, the court must consider the witness' degree 
of attention. Third, the court must consider the accuracy of the 
witness' prior description of the criminal. Fourth, the court 
must consider the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness. 
Finally, the court must consider the length of time between the 
crime and the identification by the witness. 
These five factors have also been inferentially adopted 
by the Utah Supreme Court. See State v. Larocco, 665 P.2d 1272, 
1273 (Utah 1983); State v. Newton, 657 P.2d 759 n.6 (Utah 1983); 
State v. Wulffenstein, 657 P.2d 289, 291-92 (Utah 1982), cert. 
denied, Wulffenstein v. Utah, 460 U.S. 1044 (1983). The factors 
are very similar to the test set forth by the court in State v. 
McCumber, 622 P.2d 353, 357 (Utah 1980), where the Court stated: 
Police identification procedures . . . do 
not deny theaccused due process of law 
unless, under a totality of the 
circumstances, they are so unnecessarily 
suggestive and conducive to irreparable 
mistaken identification as to deny the 
accused a fair trial. Where an 
identification procedure, even though 
suggestive, does not give rise to a 
substantial likelihood of misidentification, 
no due process violation has occurred. In 
determining the reliability of the 
identification under the totality of the 
circumstances, the court must also consider 
the opportunity of the witness to view the 
criminal at the time of the crime, the 
witness's degree of attention, the accuracy 
of any prior description of the criminal, the 
level of certainty demonstrated during the 
identification procedure, and the time 
between the crime and the identification. 
(Footnotes omitted.) 
In the present case, the State does not dispute 
defendant's contention that only one of four witnesses was in a 
position to enable them to identify defendant. However, one of 
those witnesses, Connie Luna, was in a position which enabled her 
to identify defendant and she was unequivocal in her 
identification. 
First and foremost, the identification procedures 
utilized by Detective LaMont satisfied the threshold Biggers 
requirement and were not unduly suggestive. Less than a week 
after the crime, Mrs. Luna was asked by Detective LaMont to look 
at a photo spread (T. 56). The first photo spread contained 
black and white photographs which were not recent (T. 56). Mrs. 
Luna looked at the photos and tentatively identified the 
perpetrator and stated that he "looked like the guy but [she] 
wasn't sure- (T. 57). A week or two later (T. 58), Detective 
LaMont asked her to look at a second photo spread; Mrs. Luna 
identified defendant (T. 58). Mrs. Luna also identified 
defendant at trial (T. 56). She was "positive- in her 
identification of defendant as the burglar; she explained that 
she was sure "'cause that's the guy I saw when I hollered hey you 
when I heard Mr. Ray Welch holler at him and he come across the 
street. I was standing right on the edge of the porch and I 
jumped off my porch and ran to the back of the yard where my 
driveway is and that's where he was parked with the license plate 
number. So I seen him in full view of his faceM (T. 61) 
(empha sis added)• 
Even if this Court were to find the identification 
procedure utilized by the detective to be suggestive, when 
examining the five factors outlined by the United States Supreme 
Court in Biqqers (which need be considered only if the procedure 
was suggestive), it becomes clear that Mrs. Luna's identification 
was reliable. 
First, Mrs. Luna had an adequate opportunity to observe 
defendant at the time he committed the crime. Mrs. Welch was 
standing outside on her porch waiting for her husband to get home 
(T. 46). Defendant first drew her attention when he was running 
from the Welches' home (T. 46). Although initially she saw him 
only from the back, she had an opportunity as he was running to 
observe his size and build and the clothes he was wearing. Her 
attention was focused entirely on defendant. Because she heard 
Mr. Welch yell, she knew something was wrong (T. 47). She ran 
across the yard to get a better look at defendant and yelled "hey 
you" as defendant was running toward his car (T. 47); at one 
point defendant looked at her (T. 47). When defendant got to his 
car# he paused briefly and turned around (T. 37). Mrs. Luna saw 
defendant "full face" from a distance of about twenty feet (T. 
51-52). Because she knew there was a problem, she took great 
care to observe as much detail as possible. She got a good look 
at the car and obtained the license plate number (T. 47-49). As 
a result of her attention to detail, Mrs. Luna was still able to 
remember the license plate number almost a year later when the 
case went to trial (T. 49). Consequently, the first and second 
requirements of the Biggers test were satisfied; Mrs. Luna had an 
adequate opportunity to observe defendant and gave the matter a 
significant degree of attention. 
Additionally, Mrs. Luna's prior description of 
defendant was accurate. She observed the clothing defendant was 
wearing and described his shirt as being a "red checked shirt 
that looked like tweed material and beige colored pants" (T. 51). 
She identified clothing at trial that had been seized from 
defendant's house pursuant to a search warrant (T. 55, 67). Mrs. 
Luna did not describe defendant as being twenty five, as 
defendant contends (AB 14); Mrs. Luna did not venture a guess as 
to defendant's age (T. 69). While obviously it would have been 
helpful if she were able to accurately state his age, she was not 
"inaccurate" in her prior description. 
The fourth factor of the Biggers test was also 
satisfied. Mrs. Luna demonstrated a marked level of certainty in 
her identification of defendant. Not only was she "positive," 
she was able to articulate why she was positive (T. 56-61). She 
has a rather remarkable memory as demonstrated by her ability to 
recall the license plate number of the car at trial (T. 49). 
Finally, while the time between Mrs. Luna's observation 
of defendant and her identification of him in the second photo 
spread was not ideal, the length of time was not so long as to 
render the identification unreliable* Mrs. Luna was unsure of 
the dates on which she was shown the photo spreads. She stated 
that the first was about a week after the incident, and the 
second was about two weeks after that (T. 56-58). Detective 
LaMont stated that he asked her to look at the second photo 
spread during the first of May (T. 76). Consequently, about a 
month had lapsed between her observations of defendant and her 
definite identification of him. A one month period of time is 
not necessarily suspect. In fact, in Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 
188, 201 (1972), a case in which the Supreme Court upheld the 
admissibility of the eyewitness' identification, a seven month 
period of time had lapsed between the crime and the witness' 
identification of the perpetrator. 
Defendant also contends that the fact that his was the 
only photo repeated in the second photo spread rendered the 
process unduly suggestive. However, this fact alone is 
insufficient to justify such a finding. State v. Alvarez, 145 
Ariz. 370, 701 P.2d 1178 (1985). 
When examining the totality of the circumstances, the 
identification procedures were not unduly suggestive. 
Regardless, when examining the Biggers factors, it is clear that 
Mrs. Luna's identification of defendant was reliable. There was 
not a substantial likelihood of misidentification. State v. 
McCumber, 622 P.2d 353 (Utah 1980). Defendant's due process 
rights guaranteed by the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the 
United States Constitution and article 1, section 7 of the Utah 
Constitution were not violated, and he is not entitled to a new 
trial. 
POINT II 
EVIDENCE RELATED TO DEFENDANT'S PRIOR CRIMES 
WAS NOT IMPROPERLY PRESENTED TO THE JURY. 
A. The trial court did not commit reversible 
error in admitting into evidence a photo 
spread from which an eye witness identified 
defendant. 
Defendant contends that the trial court committed 
prejudicial error in admitting into evidence a second photo 
spread from which an eyewitness, Connie Luna, made a positive 
identification of defendant. Defendant claims that introduction 
of the photo spread violated his due process rights because of an 
alleged imputation of prior criminal activity in the presentation 
and nature of the photographs. 
The trial court correctly ruled that the photo spread 
was not prejudicial in nature and that it would be beyond the 
understanding of the jurors that the photographs were taken as 
the result of a previous criminal episode of the defendant. 
Though the placard in front of the pictures said "Salt Lake 
County Sheriff," the phrase was not sufficient to plant in the 
minds of the jurors the idea that the pictures were taken in the 
course of a previous arrest. Aside from the placard designation, 
the pictures had none of the characteristics which a juror would 
associate with an arrest photograph. The pictures show no dates 
or numbers and contain only a full frontal view of the men, not 
the typical front and side view a person might associate with an 
arrest photograph. A juror looking at the photo spread could 
assume that the pictures were taken by the sheriff's office 
purely for identification purposes. 
In United States v. Harrington, 490 F.2d 487, 491 (2d 
Cir. 1973), the court approved the admission into evidence a 
photo spread containing mugshot photos which had the numbers on 
the front excised, and stated: 
[W]e felt that the jury may well have 
inferred# if their suspicions were aroused as 
all, that these were photographs taken at the 
time the defendants were arrested on the 
charges for which they were then being tried 
and were not indicative of earlier contacts 
with the law. 
The court in Harrington also looked favorably on the 
fact that the judge did not allude to anything during the 
introduction of the pictures that might have aroused any 
suspicions in the minds of the jury. Likewise, in the present 
case, there was no mention by the trial court of anything that 
may have aroused the jury's suspicions regarding prior criminal 
episodes by defendant. 
Courts have struggled with the problem of using mugshot 
photographs in the investigatory stages of the criminal process. 
While recognizing that there must be limitations on the 
admissibility of evidence which may imply prior criminal behavior 
on the part of the defendant, courts understand the necessity of 
the use of such photographs in investigatory procedures. Simmons 
v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968). Whether to admit such 
photographs during the course of a trial is an evidentiary 
determination to be made by the trial court. State v. McClain, 
706 P.2d 603 (Utah 1985). 
In the instant case, the issue before the jury was one 
of the identification of defendant by an eyewitness. The 
photographs from which the witness identified defendant are 
relevant evidence. Relevant evidence is generally admissible. 
Utah R. Evid. 402. In making the determination of relevance, 
the trial court must determine the probative value when 
juxtaposed to the prejudicial effect. Utah R. Evid. 403. Given 
the nature of the photographs and the issues at trial, the 
probative value outweighed any potential undue prejudice. 
In State v. Owens# 15 Utah 2d 123 , 388 P.2d 797 
(1964), the Utah Supreme Court upheld the admissibility of a 
photo spread containing "mugshots." In Owens, a store manager 
identified the defendant as the individual for whom he had cashed 
a forged money order. The identification took place two or three 
days after the crime and was accomplished through the use of a 
photo spread containing mugshots. The Court found the admission 
of the photo spread into evidence was relevant to the issue of 
identification. 
Defendant relies on United States v. Harrington, 490 
F.2d 487 (2d Cir. 1973) in support of his argument that the photo 
spread should not have been admitted. In Harrington, the court 
formulated a three-prong test to determine the admissibility of 
mugshots into evidence. First, the government must have a 
demonstrable need to introduce the photographs; second, the 
photographs themselves, if shown to the jury, must not imply that 
the defendant has a prior criminal record; and third, the manner 
of introduction at trial must be such that it does not draw 
particular attention to the source of implications of the 
photographs. Ld. at 495. 
The Utah courts have not adopted the Harrington 
standard and are, therefore, not bound to follow it. However, 
when applying the factors, the photo spread was admissible. 
First, the state had a demonstrable need to introduce the photo 
spread. In the instant case, defendant claimed that he was 
misidentified by the eyewitness. In addition, defendant brought 
into question the identification procedure utilized by the 
police. Mrs. Luna was asked questions about the second photo 
spread; specifically, whether any of the other men in the photo 
spread looked like defendant (T. 66). By asking questions 
concerning the content of the photo spread and implying its 
impropriety, the relevance of the photo spread became even 
greater, further justifying its admission into evidence. Even if 
the use of "mugshots" were found to suggest prior criminal 
activity, they were nonetheless admissible on the issue of 
defendant's identification and the manner in which the 
identification was made. People v. Robinson, 467 N.E.2d 291 
(111. App. 1984). 
Secondly, the photo spread itself did not inform the 
jury that defendant had a prior criminal record. The trial court 
did not find anything in the photo spread itself that would imply 
a prior criminal record (T. 93-94). The jurors may have well 
inferred, if, indeed, they had suspicions, that the photographs 
were taken for identification procedures only, and were not 
associated with prior convictions. The average juror does not 
have such a sophisticated understanding of police procedures in 
order to take the quantum leap from an observation of the photo 
spread to the knowledge that defendant was a convicted felon. 
Finally, the introduction of the photo spread did not 
draw undue attention to the source or nature of the photographs. 
Based on the Harrington standard, it is evident that the trial 
court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the photo spread. 
Nothing was done on the part of the trial court or the 
prosecution to suggest that the photographs linked defendant to 
prior criminal activity. 
As set-forth below, defendant—not the prosecution— 
informed the jury that he was a convicted felon (T. 115). 
Consequently, even if this Court were to find that the photo 
spread impermissibly linked defendant with prior criminal 
activity, it is clear that the error was harmless. "Any error, 
defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect the 
substantial rights of a party shall be disregarded." Utah R. 
Crim. P. 30 (1). 
It is well-settled that an appellate court will not 
interfere with the trial court's ruling on evidentiary matters 
absent a showing "that the court so abused its discretion that 
there is a likelihood that injustice resulted." State v. 
McClain, 706 P.2d 603, 604 (Utah 1985). See also State v. 
McCardeU, 652 P.2d 942, 944 (Utah 1982); State v. Danker, 599 
P.2d 518, 520 (Utah 1979). In the present case, there was not an 
abuse of discretion and no injustice resulted; consequently, this 
Court should affirm the ruling of the trial court on this issue. 
B. Defendant has failed to preserve the 
issue of whether evidence of his prior 
criminal convictions was admissible under 
Utah R. Evid. 609, 
Defendant filed a motion in limine in which he asked 
the trial court to rule that the prosecution be precluded from 
impeaching him pursuant to Utah R. Evid. 609 by use of his prior 
criminal convictions (R. 37). Defendant failed to obtain a 
ruling on the record on this issue. 
Consequently, defendant has failed to preserve this 
issue for appeal. It is incumbent on a moving party to obtain a 
ruling from a trial court on the substance of a motion in limine. 
Failure to obtain a ruling on the record as the result of 
oversight, abandonment of the issue, or otherwise, precludes the 
movant from raising the issue on appeal. Feldstein v. People, 
159 Colo. 107, 410 P.2d 188 (1966); State v. Knight, 78 N.M. 482, 
432 P.2d 838 (1967); Fixico v. State, 735 P.2d 580 (Okla. Cr. 
1987); Nealy v. State, 636 P.2d 378 (Okla. Cr. 1981). The Utah 
Supreme Court has stated that it will not rule on matters outside 
of the record. State v. Bingham, 684 P.2d 43 (Utah 1984); State 
v. Sparks, 672 P.2d 92 (Utah 1983), (disavowed on other grounds, 
State v. Ossana, 739 P.2d 628 (Utah 1987). 
The record in this case contains defendant's motion in 
limine (R. 37). The next reference to prior convictions for Rule 
609 impeachment purposes was made by defendant in his own direct 
testimony (T. 115). The record contains no ruling from the trial 
court. Consequently, it is impossible for this Court to review 
the trial court's determination, if indeed one was made, and this 
court should not consider the merits of the issue. 
POINT III 
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH 
DEFENDANT'S GUILT BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT 
OF BURGLARY AND THEFT. 
Defendant claims that the evidence was insufficient to 
convict him of burglary and theft. The Utah Supreme Court 
pointed out in State v. Booker, 709 P.2d 342 (Utah 1985), that 
when a defendant claims the evidence was insufficient to sustain 
his conviction, an appellate court should limit the scope of its 
review. 
,f[W]e review the evidence and all inferences 
which may reasonably be drawn from it in the 
light most favorable to the verdict of the 
jury. We reverse a jury conviction for 
insufficient evidence only when the evidence, 
so viewed, is sufficiently inconclusive or 
inherently improbable that reasonable minds 
must have entertained a reasonable doubt that 
the defendant committed the crime of which he 
was convicted." State v. Petree, Utah, 659 
P.2d 443, 444 (1983); accord State v. 
McCardell, Utah, 652 P.2d 942, 945 (1982). 
In reviewing the conviction, we do not 
substitute our judgment for that of the jury. 
"It is the exclusive function of the jury to 
weigh the evidence and to determine the 
credibility of the witnesses . . . .M State 
v. Lamm, Utah, 606 P.2d 229, 231 (1980); 
accord State v. Linden, Utah, 657 P.2d 1364, 
1366 (1983). So long as there is some 
evidence, including reasonable inferences, 
from which findings of all the requisite 
elements of the crime can reasonable be made, 
our inquiry stops. 
Id. at 345. This Court has also succinctly stated that unless 
there is a clear showing by the appellant of lack of evidence, 
the jury verdict will be upheld. State v. Gabaldon, 735 P.2d 
410, 412 (Utah App. 1987); State v. One 1982 Silver Honda 
Motorcycle, 735 P.2d 392, 393-94 (Utah App. 1987), 
A person commits burglary "if he enters or remains 
unlawfully in a building . . • with intent to commit a felony or 
theft or commit an assault on any person." If the burglary takes 
place in a dwelling, it is a second degree felony. Utah Code 
Ann. S 76-6-202 (1978). A person commits theft "if he obtains or 
exercises unauthorized control over the property of another with 
a purpose to deprive him thereof." Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-404 
(1978). If the property stolen is valued at $100 or less, the 
crime is a class B misdemeanor. Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-412 
(l)(d). The evidence in this case is sufficient to establish 
defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt on each crime. 
Ray and Katherine Welch were in their backyard doing 
yardwork when the burglary occurred (T. 17-18). A man matching 
defendant's description was seen by a neighbor on the Welches' 
porch (T. 14). Defendant unlawfully entered their home and was 
surprised by Mr. Welch when he came into the house to get a 
jacket (T. 36-37). Mr. Welch only saw defendant from behind, but 
followed him out of the house and yelled at him (T. 37). Mrs. 
Welch, hearing her husband yell, came out of the backyard and saw 
defendant run out of their front door (T. 25-26). Another 
neighbor, Connie Luna, heard Mr. Welch yell and ran down to the 
sidewalk (T. 47). She yelled at defendant and he turned and 
looked at her (T. 47) when he was about twenty feet away (T. 51). 
Mrs. Luna was able to see defendant "full face" and was able to 
later identify him (T. 51-52). 
All four witnesses observed the man get into a blue and 
white car and drive away (T. 13, 27, 37, 49). Mrs. Luna 
identified the car as a Nova and also got the license number of 
the car (T. 49). The car was registered to defendant (T. 77). 
After the incident took place, Mr. Welch discovered that 
somewhere between $4 and $50 had been taken from his and his 
wife's wallets (T. 38-39). 
Mrs. Luna has a remarkable memory. Even though the 
trial took place almost a year after the burglary, she was able 
to recall and relate the license plate number (T. 49). Mrs. Luna 
positively identified defendant from a photo spread (T. 55), at 
the preliminary hearing (T. 56), and at trial (T. 56). Mrs. Luna 
was positive in her identification and did not equivocate. 
The evidence supports the jury's conclusion that 
defendant committed the burglary and theft. The evidence was not 
so insubstantial or lacking that a reasonable person could not 
have reached a guilty verdict beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Gabaldon, 735 P.2d at 412. Therefore, defendant's convictions 
should be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
The defendant, Robert Paul Pacheco, was properly 
convicted of burglary and theft. For the foregoing reasons, and 
any additional reasons advanced at oral argument, the State of 
Utah respectfully requests that this Court affirm defendant's 
conviction. 
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